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Abstract 
Financial market conditions have been declining over the past ten years globally as most developing countries 
continue to adopt more liberal financial policies, such conditions may amplify adverse shocks to the economy. 
The Kenyan Banking sector was highly profitable before the implementation of financial market frictions, with 
industry return on equity’s average of 20%. The ratio of credit supply to gross domestic product was 35%; and the 
economy grew by 5.6 %. Nonetheless, after its adoption, listed Banks recorded negative Earnings per Share growth 
of 8.2%, compared to an average positive growth of 14.1%, The Net Interest Margin declined to 8.4% from 9.4%. 
Studies relating to financial market frictions, flight to quality and Cost of Credit have produced mixed results. It 
was on this basis that this study sought to establish the effect of financial market frictions and flight to quality on 
cost of credit in Kenya. The study adopted correlational research design. Secondary data from the Kenyan Market 
for the period January 2009 to December 2019 was analyzed. Augmented Dickey Fuller and Philips-perron unit-
root test was used to test the stationarity of the data. VECM was estimated to establish the speed of adjustment 
towards the long run equilibrium; Wald statistics was also estimated to establish short run causalities amongst the 
variables. Based on cointegrating equations, the error correction term indicated a negative sign and was significant 
at 5% level (C (1) = -0.153042, .0429 < 0.05), an indication that a long run relationship exists amongst the variables. 
Wald statistics revealed that the estimated coefficients in the VECM were insignificantly different from zero 
(.8417; .5603; .9188>p=0.05),however, Central Bank rate was found to be different from zero and significant at 
5% level (.0163>p=0.05), an indication that there was a short run casualty running from the Central Bank rate to 
cost of credit. The study therefore recommends that for Micro finance institutions to maximize their profits they 
should adopt new technologies like Mobile Banking for their credit facilities, this does not require administrative 
and operation costs, in a bid to cope with the market shocks and frictions. 
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1.0. Introduction 
Globally, financial market frictions have been a major concern to many players in the financial sector. In the 
context of the capital asset pricing model, financial market frictions is defined as anything that interferes with trade. 
These frictions can cause a market participant to be exposed to more or less risk than he/she might prefer and can 
deviate from holding the market portfolio (Kiyotaki & Wright, 1989; Mahony & Qian, 2009; Trejos & Wright, 
1995). Financial market frictions generate real costs for MFIs, recognizing these costs helps in their allocation and 
whether they are worth absorbing, especially transactions costs, such costs depend in part on market structure 
which of course also depends on both the risk of the traded asset and trading volume. In small markets for risky 
assets, i.e, MFIs, participants look for counterparties because the fixed costs of credit supply are too large to be 
offset by the lower marginal costs of each transaction if transactions are few (Mahony & Qian, 2009) . Market 
frictions are manifested as market power indivisibilities leading to economies of scale, economies of scope, 
imperfect information and incomplete market asymmetric information and positive transaction costs (Mahony & 
Qian, 2009; Kumar & Williamson, 1993).  
Empirical implications of frictions in trading processes have been analyzed, especially in preference to credit 
supply and capital asset pricing. The result is that in times of economic distress and severe disruptions to credit 
markets, it is often observed that investors rebalance their portfolios towards less risky securities, especially in 
fixed-income markets. Kashyap, Stein, and Wilcox, (1993) noted that following tightening of monetary policy, 
there were systematic increases in the relative quantity of commercial paper compared to bank lending. This 
argument introduces the concept of flight-to-quality. Bernanke and Blinder, (1988)), explained that during 
economic turmoil, low-grade firms suffer more decreases in their production and spending than large corporations. 
On the other hand, Guler and Ozlale, (2005) found out that an increase in uncertainty, which could also be viewed 
as a rise in economy-wide risk, might generate a flight-to-quality effect. When investors fly to quality they move 
out of assets with higher expected risk, such as equities and increase demand for less risky assets such as bonds, 
they concluded that flight quality effect where negative equity return associated with large positive bond return. 
Thus, additional research in this field remains highly desirable and the creation of a general framework for flight-
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to-quality analyses is needed. An analogy that this study seeks to bridge. 
To start up a business enterprise, individuals need starting capital. The act of lending money to individuals 
with the aim of starting a small business is termed as micro lending (Onyango & Odondo, 2018). The major factor 
influencing MFIs not to advance as much credit to this less fortunate cadre in lending is the non-recoverability of 
costs, ( Mohane, Coetzee & Grant, (2002); CBK, 2016; Onyango and Odondo, 2018).  For MFIs To avail all their 
services and remain sustained and active in the market, financial institutions must cover costs and expenses 
incurred which may include; cost of operations, cost of borrowing, inflation costs, cost of default and other costs 
of delinquencies,(Khandare & Alshebami, 2015; Miller, 2013; Maimbo & Gallegos, 2014). Due to financial 
market frictions, market forces of demand and supply may be greatly interfered with, and as a consequence, finding 
the equilibrium quantity and price might be very illusive. According to (Mohane et al, (2002);Khandare 
&Alshebami, (2015); Onyango and Odondo, (2018), When there is interest rate ceiling, and the equilibrium price 
is above the ceiling, the allocation of resources may be distorted, Individuals who may need loans, but due to their 
financial status lacks sufficient collaterals and in most cases, if they are uncreditworthy and do not qualify at the 
ceiling interest rate, are denied access or granted are granted at a more stringent terms and premium, this is the 
only sure way MFIs are able to recover their costs promptly. 
Provisions in anticipation of loan losses entails assessing technical accounting standards, tax implications, 
internal processes, and statutory reporting and technology software harmonization (DeFond, Hu, Hung, & Li, 
2011;Chen, Wang, & Yao, 2013 ). Bernanke and Lown (1991); Gambacorta and Shin (2016); Kishan and Opiela 
(2000, 2006); Cohen and Scatigna (2016) established that bank capitalization has a significant impact on lending 
behaviour, suggesting that, to the extent that the provisions were taken out of capital, this would have dampened 
subsequent lending. Credit reference bureaus on the other hand, reduce borrowing cost and loan delinquencies to 
a moderate extent; it enhances effective risk identification/monitoring and microcredit extension, (Gaitho, 2013). 
Credit information sharing undoubtedly plays a pivotal role in reducing the information asymmetry that exists 
between banks and borrowers. From foregoing literature, most of the related studies largely focused on developed 
countries whose GDP were higher than those of developing countries. Therefore, results from such economies 
should be treated with a lot of caution in relation to developing economies like Kenya. Consequently, a country 
specific study is inevitable for clear policy formulation. It is on this basis that the study sought to establish the 
relationship between financial market frictions, flight to quality and cost of credit.  The guiding hypotheses were; 
01H  Central Bank rate does not affect cost of credit in Kenya. 
02H  Provisions in anticipation of loan losses do not affect cost of credit in Kenya. 
03H  Non-performing loans does not affect cost of credit in Kenya. 
04H  Flight to quality and cost of credit in Kenya does not have a long run relationship 
 
2.0 Research Methodology 
2.1 Research Design 
Research design is the overall plan for obtaining answers to the research questions being studied and for handling 
some of the difficulties encountered during the research process. Saunders, Lewis, Thornhill, (2009) define a 
research design as a blueprint for conducting a study with maximum control over factors that may interfere with 
the validity of the findings. Kothari (2004) describe a research design as the arrangement of conditions for 
collection and analysis of data in a manner that aims to combine relevance to the research purpose with economy 
in procedure. This study will adopt correlation research design. Kothari (2004), states that correlation analysis 
studies the joint variation of two or more variables for determining the amount of correlation between two or more 
variables. In general, a correlational study is a quantitative method of research in which the similarities between 
two or more quantitative variables from the same group of subjects are determined. 
2.1.1 Correlation analysis. 
Correlational research design is suitable for studies that seek to establish relationships. This study adopted 
correlational research design. The study employed secondary data from the Kenyan Market for the period January 
2009 to December 2019.  The dependent variable was Cost of Credit while the independent variables were Central 
Bank Rate, provisions in anticipation of loan losses, Nonperforming loans and flight to quality – especially 
purchase of Government securities, like in this case Treasury bills. 
 
2.2 Study Area 
The study was conducted in Kenya, an African country in the Eastern region of the continent. The Country is 
surrounded by five other African countries namely; Ethiopia, Somalia, Uganda, Tanzania, and South Sudan. 
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Kenya lies between latitudes N02/41  and S02/41  
longitudes E034  and E042 . The country covers 
569,140 square kilometers of land and 11,227 square kilometers of water, with a total area of 580,367 square 
kilometers. Her population is approximately 47,564,296 according to the 2019 population census. The GPS 
coordinates of Kenya show that the country is bisected by the equator. Approximately half of Kenya is in the 
northern hemisphere. 
 
Figure 1.0: Position and shape of Kenya 
 
2.3 Data Type, Sources and Collection Methods 
The data used in this study was sourced mainly from financial statements of Banks, Bank Supervision reports, 
Official websites of commercial Banks, Think Business Banking Survey and publicly listed enterprises. Our time 
series data set covers the period from the first month of 2009 to the last month of 2019. We also used several 
macroeconomic series, which are mostly sourced from the Central Bank of Kenya website. This diminishes the 
problems associated with heterogeneous demand shocks, because the share of different types of loans in the banks’ 
portfolios does not differ significantly. 
 
2.4 Model Specification. 
A general Vector Autoregressive Model (VAR) of order “P” below was used to generate VECM; 
tptpttt YYYY εν +Α++Α+Α+= −−− ...2211
                                    (1.0)                                                      
 
Where: P is a positive integer, iΑ are fixed ( Κ×Κ ) coefficient matrices for 1=i , =ν  is a fixed 
( )1×Κ vector of intercept terms, tε is assumed to be multivariate normal, is a white noise with zero and positive 
definite covariance matrix ( )εσε 20,iidN~t .  
VECM was applied to find long-run equilibrium associations. To assess the short-run and long-run 
coefficients of the variables, we developed the following from equation (1.0) to form a VECM model and is 
generated recursively as; 
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Where: 1−k = Shows the lag length, which is reduced by 1. 
iλ  = This is the Speed of adjustment parameter with a negative sign. It measures the speed at which the dependent 
variable(s) returns to equilibrium after changes in independent variables. itµ = Residuals (Stochastic error term). 
iφ , jφ , mφ , pφ  and nφ  = are short run dynamic coefficients of the model’s adjustment long run equilibrium. 
CC = Cost of Credit  
CBR = Central Bank Rate 
PALL = Provisions in Anticipation of Loan Losses 
NPL = Non Performing Loans 
TBLL= Treasury Bills 
ECT = (Error Correction Term), it is the lagged value of the residuals obtained from the cointegrating regression 
of the dependent variable on the regressors.  
It contains long-run information derived from the long-run cointegrating relationships. This study expresses the 
lagged OLS residual obtained from the long-run cointegrating equations as; 
                                                                                           (1.2)                                                                                             
From equation (1.2) we can re-write Error Correction Term (ECT) as;
 
                                                                                   (1.3)                                                                                     
2.5 Data Analysis.
 
Augmented Dickey Fuller (ADF) unit-root test and Philips perron test (PP) was done to check the stationarity of 
the time series data on the basis of a null hypothesis that the time series were non stationary (i.e. δ = 0) and 
alternative hypothesis that the time series were stationary (i.e. δ ≠ 0). This was undertaken as a precautionary 
measure against estimation of spurious regression models (Sim et al., 1990). 
The ADF unit root test will take the form of; 
ttttt YbYbYY εα ++∆+∆++=∆ −−− ...a 231210                                        (1.4)                                                                      
where;  is the difference operator,  0a  is a constant, andα  is the autoregressive lag coefficient. The ADF 
then tests the hypothesis; the null hypothesis for the test is given below; 
0:0 =αH , there exists a unit root problem. If t-statistic > ADF critical value, accept the null hypothesis. If t-
statistic < ADF critical value, reject the null hypothesis. If the null hypothesis is rejected, the data of the series is 
stationary and can be used for modeling without taking any difference of the series. The Dickey–Fuller test 
statistics have been criticized for their low power, especially in distinguishing between unit roots and near unit 
roots and in small sample data while Phillips–Perron (PP, 1988) test is more robust to serial correlation, time 
dependent heteroscedasticity and regime changes (Moosa & Bhatti, 1997).  
 
2.6 Cointegration Test 
Cointegration test was performed to confirm the long run relationships amongst the variables. Johansen (1988), 
Johansen and Joselius (1990) Cointegration test was adopted, the two proposed two different likelihood ratio tests: 








ˆ1ln λ                                                                                       (1.5)                                  
( )1max ˆ1ln +−−= rTJ λ                                                             (1.6)                                                        
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where:  T is the sample size and iλ̂  is the 
thi largest canonical correlation. The trace test tests the null hypothesis 
of “r” cointegrating vectors against the alternative hypothesis of “n” cointegrating vectors. The maximum 
eigenvalue test, on the other hand, tests the null hypothesis of “r” cointegrating vectors against the alternative 
hypothesis of r +1 cointegrating vectors. 
 
3.0 Results and Discussions. 
3.1 Descriptive Statistics. 
Table 1 presents the descriptive statistics for the data collected. Mean average Cost of Credit was  = 88842.00 
( = 35476.94), this means that the average loans disbursed during the period of review had an average cost of 
kshs. 88,842.00 Million Charged over the period. Central Bank Rate, Non performing loans, Provisions in 
anticipation of loan losses and Treasury Bills had a mean of   = 12.57765 ( = 3.707730) ;  = 171556.1 ( 
= 87523.47);  = 137850.5 ( = 32506.62); and  = 249731.3 ( = 164627.2) respectively, an indication that 
during the period of review, the Banking sector had an average of 12.575% CBR, Loans amounting to 
Kshs.171,556.1 Million were non performing, total provisions was Kshs.137,850.5 Million and had invested in 
kshs. 249,731.3 Million in treasury bills.  
Table 1: Descriptive statistics - financial market frictions, flight to quality and Cost of Credit. 
 CC  CBR NPL PALL TBLL 
 Mean  88842.00  12.57765  171556.1  137850.5  249731.3 
 Median  80958.80  11.50000  160800.0  134900.0  188468.9 
 Maximum  147300.0  18.75000  347700.0  216700.0  610220.7 
 Minimum  24740.22  8.500000  56500.00  55600.00  39161.20 
 Std. Dev.  35476.94  3.707730  87523.47  32506.62  164627.2 
 Skewness  0.051221  0.438742  0.553438  0.090422  0.779435 
 Kurtosis  1.751861  1.526030  2.244132  4.655888  2.401986 
 Jarque-Bera  8.625894  16.18411  9.880808  15.26068  15.33234 
 Probability  0.013394  0.000306  0.007152  0.000485  0.000468 
 Sum  11727144  1660.250  22645400  18196267  32964535 
 Sum Sq. Dev.  1.65E+11  1800.892  1.00E+12  1.38E+11  3.55E+12 
 Observations  132  132  132  132  132 
Key: CC= Cost of Credit, CBR= Central bank Rate, NPL=  Non Performing Loans, 
  PALL= Provisions in anticipation of Loan Losses, TBLL= Treasury Bills. 
Source: Authors computations (2020) 
 
3.2 Diagnostic Tests. 
3.2.1 Normality Test. 
Normality test was then conducted using Jarque-Bera statistics and the results are presented in Figure 2.0. The 
results shows that the P- value for the Jarque-Bera statistics is more than 5% (i.e 0.677570 > p=0.05), an indication 
that the data used were normally distributed.  











Mean      -2.13e-11
Median   1605.643
Maximum  57570.67
Minimum -50605.31
Std. Dev.   19490.58
Skewness  -0.176477
Kurtosis   3.130256
Jarque-Bera  0.778485
Probability   0.677570
Source: Author’s computations (2020) 
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3.2.2: Test for Heteroskedasticity. 
The study further tested for the Breusch-Pagan-Godfrey Heteroskedasticity effect, with the null hypothesis that 
the error term was not heteroskedastic. Since the estimated P-value(s) corresponding to the observed R-squared 
was more than 5% (0.1127> 0.05), the null hypothesis that the error term was not heteroskedastic was confirmed 
as seen in Table 2. 
Table 2: Breusch-Pagan-Godfrey Heteroskedasticity Test for Cost of Credit and the Explanatory Variables 
Source: Author’s computations (2020) 
 
3.3: Correlation Analysis. 
Table 3: Correlation matrix of Cost of Credit, flight to quality and financial market frictions. 
      
      Correlation     
Probability CC  CBR  NPL  PALL  TBLL  
CC  1.000000     
CBR  0.805565 1.000000    
 0.0000   
NPL  0.180101 0.210076 1.000000   
 0.0388 0.0156  
PALL  -0.296420 -0.321434 0.105641 1.000000  
 0.0006 0.0002 0.2280 
TBLL  -0.687075 -0.691151 0.176250 0.589743 1.000000 
 0.0000 0.0000 0.0432 0.0000 
      
Key: CC= Cost of Credit, CBR= Central bank Rate, NPL=  Non Performing Loans, 
 PALL= Provisions in anticipation of Loan Losses, TBLL= Treasury Bills. 
Source: Author’s computations (2020) 
 
3.4. Unit Root test. 
For stationarity of data to be achieved, the overall behavior of the data set should remain constant (Gujarat & 
Porter, 2009). Stationarity of the time series data is important in ensuring that an accurate forecasting of events is 
realised. Time series data was therefore, first subjected to stationarity test. Augmented Dickey-Fuller test (ADF) 
and Philips perron test (PP) was used to test for the stationarity. As a rule of thumb, the null hypothesis assumes 
the presence of unit root, and the p-value obtained should be less than the significance level (e.g. 0.05) while the 
absolute value of the test statistic should also be less than the critical value for the rejection of the null hypothesis. 
Referring to the above rule of thumb, the data sets for CC, CBR, NPL, PALL and TBLL in table(s) 4 and 5 have 
unit root. The ADF p-values obtained for each data set was greater than 5% (p=0.05 
< .5545, .1201, .3655, .9327, .9428), this compares well with the p-values for PP (p=0.05 
<.5126, .2535, .3659, .0809, .9472) which are also clearly greater than 5%. Similarly, the absolute values of the 
test statistics for each of the variables for both the ADF and PP are less than the corresponding absolute values of 
the test statistics at 5% level of significance. The study thus concludes that the series are non stationary at levels. 
Table 4: Unit Root Test of the variables in level    
  Augmented Dickey-Fuller test statistics       
Variable At levels p-value 1% 5% 10% Observation 
CC -1.452559 0.5545 -3.481217 -2.883753* -2.578694    Unit Root exists 
CBR -2.490339 0.1201 -3.480818 -2.883579* -2.578601    Unit Root exists 
NPL -1.828236 0.3655 -3.480818 -2.883579* -2.578601    Unit Root exists 
PALL -0.212380 0.9327 -3.483312 -2.884665* -2.579180    Unit Root exists 
TBLL -0.130156 0.9428 -3.480818 -2.883579* -2.578601    Unit Root exists 
Key: CC= Cost of Credit, CBR= Central bank Rate,    
  NPL=  Non Performing Loans, PALL= Provisions in anticipation of 
   Loan Losses, TBLL= Treasury Bills.       
Source: Author’s computations (2020)  
 
 
     
F-statistic 1.906804    Prob. F(4,127) 0.1133 
Obs*R-squared 7.478371    Prob. Chi-Square(4) 0.1127 
Scaled explained SS 7.373412    Prob. Chi-Square(4) 0.1174 
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Table 5: Unit Root Test of the variables in level    
  Philips – Perron Unit Root Test Statistics       
Variable At levels p-value 1% 5% 10% Observation 
CC -1.535630 0.5126 -3.480818 -2.883579* -2.578601   Unit Root exists 
CBR -2.079143 0.2535 -3.480818 -2.883579* -2.578601   Unit Root exists 
NPL -1.827297 0.3659  -3.480818 -2.883579* -2.578601   Unit Root exists 
PALL -2.676218 0.0809 -3.480818 -2.883579* -2.578601   Unit Root exists 
TBLL -0.091013 0.9472 -3.480818 -2.883579* -2.578601   Unit Root exists 
Key: CC= Cost of Credit, CBR= Central bank Rate,    
  NPL=  Non Performing Loans, PALL= Provisions in anticipation of 
   Loan Losses, TBLL= Treasury Bills.       
Source: Author’s computations (2020)         
Table 6 and 7 shows the unit root test results for the series at first difference. From Tables 6 and 7 we can 
deduce that unit root does not exist in each of the series at first difference since the p-values for both the ADF and 
PP are less than 5% level of significance (p=0.05 < 0.0000). The deduction is further supported by the absolute 
value of the test statistics for each of the variables which are more than the corresponding absolute value of the 
test statistics at 5% level of significance. The study thus concludes that the series are stationary at first difference. 
Table 6 : Unit Root Test of the variables after 1st Difference    
  Augmented Dickey-Fuller test statistics       
Variable At levels p-value 1% 5% 10% Observation 
D(CC) -15.48620 0.0000 -3.481217 -2.883753* -2.578694 No Unit Root  
D(CBR) -13.93340 0.0000 -3.481217 -2.883753* -2.578694 No Unit Root  
D(NPL) -11.46304 0.0000 -3.481217 -2.883753* -2.578694 No Unit Root  
D(PALL) -8.858641 0.0000 -3.483312 -2.884665* -2.579180 No Unit Root  
D(TBLL) -11.18445 0.0000 -3.481217 -2.883753* -2.578694 No Unit Root  
Key: CC= Cost of Credit, CBR= Central bank Rate, NPL=  Non Performing Loans,   
         PALL= Provisions in anticipation of Loan Losses, TBLL= Treasury Bills.   
Source: Author’s computations (2020) 
 
Table 7 : Unit Root Test of the variables after 1st Difference    
  Philips – Perron Unit Root Test Statistics       
Variable At levels p-value        1% 5% 10% Observation 
D(CC) -22.36075 0.0000 -3.481217 -2.883753* -2.578694 No Unit Root  
D(CBR) -21.08197 0.0000 -3.481217 -2.883753* -2.578694 No Unit Root  
D(NPL) -11.51830 0.0000 -3.481217 -2.883753* -2.578694 No Unit Root  
D(PALL) -11.62789 0.0000 -3.481217 -2.883753* -2.578694 No Unit Root  
D(TBLL) -11.18351 0.0000 -3.481217 -2.883753* -2.578694 No Unit Root  
Key: CC= Cost of Credit, CBR= Central bank Rate,    
  NPL=  Non Performing Loans, PALL= Provisions in anticipation of 
   Loan Losses, TBLL= Treasury Bills.       
Source: Author’s computations (2020) 
 
3.5 Vector Auto Regression (VAR) Lag Order Selection Criteria 
Table 8 shows VAR lag order selection criteria for Cost of Credit and the explanatory variables. Final prediction 
error (FPE), LR and Akaike information criterion (AIC) test statistic suggests lag 7 as the optimal lag. Schwarz 
information criterion (SC) and the Hannan-Quinn information criterion (HQ) suggest lag 1 as the optimal lag. 
Liew (2004) suggest that most economic sample data can seldom be considered large in size, AIC and FPE are 
therefore, recommended for the estimation of their autoregressive lag length, and since the observations in this 
study were relatively large, the Akaike information criterion (AIC) which suggested lag 7 at 93.85311* was chosen 
for the autoregressive lag length for cost of credit. 
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Table 8: VAR Lag Order Selection Criteria for Cost of Credit and the explanatory variables 
       
       
 Lag LogL LR FPE AIC SC HQ 
       
0 -6369.859 NA   3.10e+38  102.8203  102.9340  102.8665 
1 -5808.828  1067.770  5.46e+34  94.17464   94.85697*   94.45182* 
2 -5793.660  27.64374  6.41e+34  94.33323  95.58416  94.84139 
3 -5779.106  25.35338  7.63e+34  94.50170  96.32124  95.24084 
4 -5748.536  50.78473  7.04e+34  94.41187  96.80001  95.38199 
5 -5717.485  49.08131  6.48e+34  94.31427  97.27102  95.51537 
6 -5682.350  52.70246  5.63e+34  94.15080  97.67615  95.58288 
7 -5638.893   61.68065*   4.31e+34*   93.85311*  97.94707  95.51617 
8 -5621.060  23.87256  5.06e+34  93.96872  98.63128  95.86276 
       
 * indicates lag order selected by the criterion   
 LR: sequential modified LR test statistic (each test at 5% level)  
 FPE: Final prediction error     
 AIC: Akaike information criterion    
 SC: Schwarz information criterion    
 HQ: Hannan-Quinn information criterion    
Source: Author’s computations (2020) 
 
3.6. Cointegration Test 
Data was then subjected to Cointegration test, Johansen (1988) and Johansen and Joselius (1990) two different 
likelihood ratio tests were adopted. Since the variables were stationary at first difference as shown in tables 6 and 
7, cointegration test was therefore, necessary to establish a long run relationship. Results obtained from the Trace 
statistics and Maximum Eigenvalue Statistics as captured in Table 9 and Table 10 respectively, indicated that there 
is one (1) cointegrating equation or one error term >> At most 1, p=0.1740=17.4% and p=  0.2474 = 24.74% 
Statistics respectively at 5% level of significance, meaning all the variables are cointegrating. The null hypothesis 
that there is no Cointegrating equation is thus rejected. The results therefore, suggest that in the long run, the 
variables move together or have a long run association. 
Table 9: Unrestricted Cointegration Rank Test (Trace) for Cost of Credit and the explanatory variables. 
     
Hypothesized  Trace 0.05  
No. of CE(s) Eigenvalue Statistic Critical Value Prob.** 
     
None *  0.290745  70.83750  69.81889  0.0414 
At most 1  0.118985  28.23857  47.85613  0.8033 
At most 2  0.063688  12.53023  29.79707  0.9118 
At most 3  0.033547  4.370280  15.49471  0.8715 
At most 4  0.001121  0.139075  3.841466  0.7092 
     
 Trace test indicates 1 cointegrating eqn(s) at the 0.05 level 
 * denotes rejection of the hypothesis at the 0.05 level 
 **MacKinnon-Haug-Michelis (1999) p-values  
Source: Author’s computations (2020) 
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Table 10: Unrestricted Cointegration Rank Test (Maximum Eigenvalue) for Cost of Credit and the explanatory 
variables 
     
Hypothesized  Max-Eigen 0.05  
No. of CE(s) Eigenvalue Statistic Critical Value Prob.** 
     
None *  0.290745  42.59893  33.87687  0.0036 
At most 1  0.118985  15.70835  27.58434  0.6904 
At most 2  0.063688  8.159947  21.13162  0.8936 
At most 3  0.033547  4.231205  14.26460  0.8342 
At most 4  0.001121  0.139075  3.841466  0.7092 
     
 Max-eigenvalue test indicates 1 cointegrating eqn(s) at the 0.05 level 
 * denotes rejection of the hypothesis at the 0.05 level 
 **MacKinnon-Haug-Michelis (1999) p-values  
Source: Author’s computations (2020) 
Table 11 shows normalized cointegrating coefficients. From the table, while it can be concluded that Central 
Bank Rate and Treasury bills, on average, had a positive effect on cost of credit in the long run, Ceteris Paribus, 
Non-performing loans and Provision in anticipation for loan losses, on average, had a negative effect on cost of 
credit, ceteris paribus. The coefficients are statistically significant at 5% level.  Since the coefficients are just OLS 
estimates, they have to be interpreted as ceteris paribus effects, and the signs reversed in the long run (Green, 
(2003); Gujarat and Porter, (2009); Wooldridge, (2009). The null hypothesis that there is no Cointegrating equation 
is thus rejected. This means that there is a cointegrating relationship in the model. 
Table 11: Normalized cointegrating coefficients (standard error in parentheses) for cost of credit  
      
      1 Cointegrating Equation(s):  Log likelihood -5637.077   
      
CC CBR NPL PALL TBLL  
 1.000000 -15334.03  0.082959 -5.066735 -0.082624  
  (1966.24)  (0.04605)  (2.37272)  (0.67689)  
Adjustment coefficients (standard error in parentheses)   
D(CC) -0.153042     
  (0.07447)     
D(CBR)  3.24E-05     
  (6.7E-06)     
D(NPL) -0.098528     
  (0.17342)     
D(PALL) -0.131603     
  (0.07076)     
D(TBLL)  0.020896     
  (0.13101)     
      
      
Source: Author’s computations (2020) 
 
3.7. Vector Error Correction Model. 
3.7.1. Vector Error Correction Model for Cost of credit and its explanatory variables 
The vector error correction estimates (Appendix 1) were estimated based on the existence of the cointegrating 
equations. From the Appendix 1, the long run model explains the error correction term that signifies the long run 
relationship among the variables. As may be concluded from the estimates, the model posits that Central Bank 
rate, provisions in anticipation of loan losses, treasury bills and nonperforming loans are important determinants 
of cost of credit in the long run (t-statistics 2 < -7.779867, 2 < 2.80890 and 2 < -3.44197 respectively), the null 
hypothesis that there is no long run relationship among the variables is rejected, Results in Appendix 1 shows that 
one unit change in Central Bank rate and treasury bills is associated with 15,334.03 units and 0.192070 units 
respectively, increase in cost of credit  on average ceteris paribus in the long run.  Both the Central Bank rate and 
Treasury bills were directly related to cost of credit. While on the other hand, one unit change in provisions in 
anticipation of loan losses and nonperforming loans is associated with 0.582190 units and 0.082959 units 
respectively, decrease in cost of credit on average ceteris paribus in the long run.  Both the provisions in 
anticipation of loan losses and nonperforming loans were inversely related to cost of credit. The null hypothesis 
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From the Appendix 1, the previous periods deviation from long run equilibrium is corrected in the current 
period at an adjustment speed of 15.3 % ( CointEq1 = -0.153042). Table 12 shows a make system approach, the 
results shows that Nonperforming loans, provisions in anticipation of loan losses and treasury bills are not 
important determinants of cost of credit  in the short run,  (t-statistics 2 > 0.798599; 2 > 0.988691 and 2 > -0.305125 
respectively), and were statistically insignificant at 5% level in the short run (p=0.05 < 0.4267; p=0.05 < 0.3256; 
and p=0.05 < 0.7610 respectively), the null hypothesis that there is no short run relationship among the variables 
is accepted.  Central Bank rate, however, returned as an important determinant of cost of credit (t-statistics 2< -
3.585777) and was statistically significant at 5% level (p=0.05 > 0.0006), and it had an expected negative sign (φ
= - 3953.296), which is a good sign, an indication that there is a short run relationship between Central Bank rate 
and Cost of Credit (Green, (2003); Gujarat and Porter, (2009); Wooldridge, (2009). The null hypothesis that there 
is no short run relationship between Central Bank rate and cost of credit is therefore, rejected. A Wald test statistic 
(table’s 19a, b, c, and d) is further performed to confirm if indeed there is no short run relationship among the 
explanatory variables; Nonperforming loans, provisions in anticipation of loan losses, treasury bills and cost of 














Table 12 shows the VECM that was estimated based on the existence of the cointegrating equations. The 
dependent variable was Cost of Credit (CC) while the independent variables were Central Bank Rate (CBR), Non 
Performing Loans (NPLs), Provisions in anticipation for Loan Losses (PALL) and Treasury Bills (TBLL). The 
error correction term indicated the expected sign and was significant at 5% level (C (1) = -0.153042, p = .0.0429< 
0.05), this means that the speed of adjustment towards long run equilibrium is negative and statistically significant. 
This implies that there is a long run causality running from Central Bank Rate (CBR) to cost of credit, in other 
words, Central Bank Rate has influence on cost of credit, this observation corroborates with Demetriades and 
Luintel (2001) who asserted that the use of interest rate ceilings, distorts the economy and inhibits financial 
deepening by depressing real rates of interest, consequently, MFIs levies other charges in a bid to recover their 
costs, in essence these additional charges increases cost of credit. Mohane et al, (2002) further supports this 
argument by stating that ceilings produces a series of adverse effects, they argue that since MFIs are not allowed 
to charge full cost recovery interest rates, they then drift up their operating costs thereby increasing their cost of 
credit. Table 18 also shows that there is a long run causality running from Non Performing Loans (NPLs) to cost 
of credit, this observation corroborates with Brown, Jappelli, and Pagano, (2009) whose estimates in their study 
showed that information sharing is associated with improved availability and lower cost of credit, Gaitho, (2013) 
observed that CRB reduces borrowing costs and loan delinquencies to a moderate extent.  
These observations  however, contradicts  Khandare and Alshebami, (2015); Miller, (2013) argument  that  
for MFIs to remain sustained and active in the market, it is mandatory for them to cover their costs; cost of 
borrowing, cost of operation, inflation cost, cost of default loans and other costs of delinquencies must be levied 
on the borrower and expenses incurred when carrying out their activities not forgetting to add their profit margin.  
There was also a long run causality running from Provisions in anticipation for Loan Losses to cost of credit, this 
corroborates Hela, Senda, Younes & Collins (2016), they concluded that IFRS 9 adoption represents a key 
determinant of information asymmetry reduction, they argue this contributes significantly to decrease in cost of 
credit for post IFRS 9 period. This however, contradicts Chen et al, (2013), who indicated that IFRS adoption led 
to higher interest rates, greater likelihood of demand for collateral and shorter maturities, Gehrig and Stenbacka, 
(2007) who also contradicts this narrative stated that issues to do with lower credit ratings pay higher interest rates 
embodying larger risk premiums than higher rated issuers. Lastly, Table 18 shows that there exists a long run 
causality running from Treasury Bills to Cost of Credit; this observation corroborates Gubareva and Borges (2013) 
who noted that flight-to-quality events can be observed while correlation between safe and risky assets 
performance holds and, in some cases with increasing prices of risky assets, Jones, (2012) offered a further opinion 
arguing that flight to quality a cross financial markets have a strong negative interaction in sovereign debt markets, 
the structure of collaterals offered by individual micro enterprises led higher cost of credit. Their argument 
however, contradicts Gatev and Strahan (2006) who studied Banks’ balance sheets and found out that when the 
spread between treasury bills and high grade commercial paper increases, Banks tend to experience inflows of 
deposits and decreased cost of funding.  
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Table 12. Vector Error Correction Model and the System Equation for Cost of Credit 
Dependent Variable: D(CC)   
Method: Least Squares (Gauss-Newton / Marquardt steps) 
Sample (adjusted): 9 132   
Included observations: 124 after adjustments  
D(CC) = C(1)*( CC(-1) - 15334.0261931*CBR(-1) + 0.0829594070514 
        *NPL(-1) + 0.582189784479*PALL(-1) - 0.192069862133*TBLL(-1) + 
        56530.3926015 ) + C(2)*D(CC(-1)) + C(3)*D(CC(-2)) + C(4)*D(CC(-3))  
        + C(5)*D(CC(-4)) + C(6)*D(CC(-5)) + C(7)*D(CC(-6)) + C(8)*D(CC(-7))  
        + C(9)*D(CBR(-1)) + C(10)*D(CBR(-2)) + C(11)*D(CBR(-3)) + C(12) 
        *D(CBR(-4)) + C(13)*D(CBR(-5)) + C(14)*D(CBR(-6)) + C(15)*D(CBR( 
        -7)) + C(16)*D(NPL(-1)) + C(17)*D(NPL(-2)) + C(18)*D(NPL(-3)) + 
        C(19)*D(NPL(-4)) + C(20)*D(NPL(-5)) + C(21)*D(NPL(-6)) + C(22) 
        *D(NPL(-7)) + C(23)*D(PALL(-1)) + C(24)*D(PALL(-2)) + C(25)*D(PALL( 
        -3)) + C(26)*D(PALL(-4)) + C(27)*D(PALL(-5)) + C(28)*D(PALL(-6)) + 
        C(29)*D(PALL(-7)) + C(30)*D(TBLL(-1)) + C(31)*D(TBLL(-2)) + C(32) 
        *D(TBLL(-3)) + C(33)*D(TBLL(-4)) + C(34)*D(TBLL(-5)) + C(35) 
        *D(TBLL(-6)) + C(36)*D(TBLL(-7)) + C(37) 
     
      Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
     
     C(1) -0.153042 0.074472 -2.055024 0.0429 
C(2) -0.280753 0.116530 -2.409275 0.0181 
C(3) -0.230195 0.118100 -1.949152 0.0545 
C(4) -0.241145 0.127314 -1.894096 0.0615 
C(5) -0.047669 0.127073 -0.375133 0.7085 
C(6) 0.087582 0.117147 0.747624 0.4567 
C(7) -0.145295 0.107680 -1.349321 0.1807 
C(8) 0.150619 0.104026 1.447890 0.1512 
C(9) -1501.327 1246.263 -1.204663 0.2316 
C(10) -1651.559 1361.153 -1.213352 0.2283 
C(11) -2948.099 1225.617 -2.405400 0.0183 
C(12) -1658.147 1216.470 -1.363081 0.1764 
C(13) -2097.526 1099.167 -1.908286 0.0597 
C(14) -3953.296 1102.494 -3.585777 0.0006 
C(15) -360.4434 1103.425 -0.326659 0.7447 
C(16) -0.058215 0.046583 -1.249688 0.2148 
C(17) -0.036327 0.046481 -0.781555 0.4366 
C(18) 0.011731 0.047319 0.247923 0.8048 
C(19) -0.000613 0.048260 -0.012697 0.9899 
C(20) -0.036601 0.046271 -0.791015 0.4311 
C(21) 0.039657 0.049658 0.798599 0.4267 
C(22) -0.009090 0.051927 -0.175061 0.8614 
C(23) 0.019035 0.110820 0.171765 0.8640 
C(24) -0.087110 0.102760 -0.847702 0.3989 
C(25) -0.111448 0.087554 -1.272906 0.2064 
C(26) -0.010655 0.089800 -0.118655 0.9058 
C(27) -0.084158 0.091313 -0.921643 0.3593 
C(28) 0.099037 0.100170 0.988691 0.3256 
C(29) -0.132993 0.107190 -1.240716 0.2180 
C(30) 0.027159 0.058470 0.464491 0.6435 
C(31) 0.038888 0.059600 0.652484 0.5158 
C(32) 0.012957 0.058380 0.221936 0.8249 
C(33) 0.075946 0.058847 1.290553 0.2003 
C(34) -0.002819 0.058709 -0.048019 0.9618 
C(35) -0.017641 0.057817 -0.305125 0.7610 
C(36) 0.003123 0.058532 0.053357 0.9576 
C(37) -2657.863 1522.141 -1.746135 0.0843 
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R-squared 0.439463    Mean dependent var -759.6753 
Adjusted R-squared 0.207517    S.D. dependent var 14245.71 
S.E. of regression 12681.75    Akaike info criterion 21.97612 
Sum squared resid 1.40E+10    Schwarz criterion 22.81765 
Log likelihood -1325.519    Hannan-Quinn criter. 22.31797 
F-statistic 1.894676    Durbin-Watson stat 1.995054 
Prob(F-statistic) 0.008307    
     
     Source: Author’s computations (2020) 
 
3.8. Short run Causalities 
3.8.1. Short run casualties for cost of credit and its explanatory variables. 
The study further employed Wald statistics to test whether or not the estimated coefficients in the VECM were 
significantly different from zero (i, e.) C(9)=C(10)=C(11)= C(12)=C(13)= C(14)=C(15)=0;C(16)= 
C(17)=C(18)=C(19)=C(20)=C(21)=C(22)=0;C(23)=C(24)=C(25)=C(26)=C(27)=C(28)=C(29)=0;andC(30)
=C(31)=C(32)=C(33)= C(34)=C(35)= C(36)=0. The Chi-square probability corresponding to the null hypothesis 
on Central Bank rate to cost of credit as presented in Table 13a is less than 5% (.0163<p=0.05). Thus, the null 
hypothesis of C(9)=C(10)=C(11)= C(12)=C(13)=C(14)=C(15)=0 is rejected, implying that there is short run 
causality running from Central Bank rate to cost of credit and is significantly different from zero. The Chi-square 
probability corresponding to the null hypothesis on other variables as presented in Table 13a-d were more than 5% 
(.8417; .5603; .9188>p=0.05). Thus, the null hypothesis of 
C(16)=C(17)=C(18)=C(19)=C(20)=C(21)=C(22)=0;C(23)=C(24)=C(25)=C(26)= C(27)=C(28)=C(29)=0; and  
C(30)=C(31)=C(32)=C(33)= C(34)=C(35)= C(36)=0 is accepted, implying that there is no short run causality 
running from Nonperforming loans to cost of credit as shown in Table 13b. Table 13c shows a similar observation 
from Provision in anticipation of loan losses to cost of credit. And lastly, Table 13d, indicates that there is no short 
run causality running from Treasury Bills to cost of credit. This is interdem with Kashyap, Stein, and Wilcox, 
(1993) who stated that, in the short run, the relation among the variables would be unstable and may fail to support 
the expectation hypothesis due to variable term premiums which are not under the control of the monetary 
authorities – especially in recent times when there are frictions after in the financial markets. 
Table 13a: Wald Test for Central Bank Rate Coefficients on cost of credit 
Wald Test:   
Equation: Untitled  
    
    Test Statistic Value df Probability 
    
    F-statistic  2.454014 (7, 87)  0.0241 
Chi-square  17.17810  7  0.0163 
    
    Null Hypothesis: C(9)=C(10)=C(11)=C(12)=C(13)=C(14)=C( 
        15)=0   
Null Hypothesis Summary:  
    
    Normalized Restriction (= 0) Value Std. Err. 
    
    C(9) -1501.327  1246.263 
C(10) -1651.559  1361.153 
C(11) -2948.099  1225.617 
C(12) -1658.147  1216.470 
C(13) -2097.526  1099.167 
C(14) -3953.296  1102.494 
C(15) -360.4434  1103.425 
    
    Restrictions are linear in coefficients. 
Source: Author’s computations (2020) 
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Table 13b: Wald Test for Non Performing Loans Coefficients on cost of credit 
Wald Test:   
Equation: Untitled  
    
    Test Statistic Value df Probability 
    
    F-statistic  0.491261 (7, 87)  0.8386 
Chi-square  3.438827  7  0.8417 
    
    Null Hypothesis: C(16)=C(17)=C(18)=C(19)=C(20)=C(21)= 
        C(22)=0   
Null Hypothesis Summary:  
    
    Normalized Restriction (= 0) Value Std. Err. 
    
    C(16) -0.058215  0.046583 
C(17) -0.036327  0.046481 
C(18)  0.011731  0.047319 
C(19) -0.000613  0.048260 
C(20) -0.036601  0.046271 
C(21)  0.039657  0.049658 
C(22) -0.009090  0.051927 
    
    
Restrictions are linear in coefficients. 
Source: Author’s computations (2020) 
 
Table 13c: Wald Test for Provision in anticipation of loan losses Coefficients on cost of credit 
Wald Test:   
Equation: Untitled  
    
    Test Statistic Value df Probability 
    
    F-statistic  0.832166 (7, 87)  0.5635 
Chi-square  5.825164  7  0.5603 
    
    Null Hypothesis: C(23)=C(24)=C(25)=C(26)=C(27)=C(28)= 
        C(29)=0   
Null Hypothesis Summary:  
    
    Normalized Restriction (= 0) Value Std. Err. 
    
    C(23)  0.019035  0.110820 
C(24) -0.087110  0.102760 
C(25) -0.111448  0.087554 
C(26) -0.010655  0.089800 
C(27) -0.084158  0.091313 
C(28)  0.099037  0.100170 
C(29) -0.132993  0.107190 
    
    
Restrictions are linear in coefficients. 
Source: Author’s computations (2020) 
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Table 13d: Wald Test for Treasury bills Coefficients on cost of credit 
Wald Test:   
Equation: Untitled  
    
    Test Statistic Value df Probability 
    
    F-statistic  0.372409 (7, 87)  0.9161 
Chi-square  2.606864  7  0.9188 
    
    Null Hypothesis: C(30)=C(31)=C(32)=C(33)=C(34)=C(35)= 
        C(36)=0   
Null Hypothesis Summary:  
    
    Normalized Restriction (= 0) Value Std. Err. 
    
    C(30)  0.027159  0.058470 
C(31)  0.038888  0.059600 
C(32)  0.012957  0.058380 
C(33)  0.075946  0.058847 
C(34) -0.002819  0.058709 
C(35) -0.017641  0.057817 
C(36)  0.003123  0.058532 
    
    
Restrictions are linear in coefficients. 
Source: Author’s computations (2020) 
 
3.9. Post Analysis diagnostic Tests 
Table 14 shows Breusch-Godfrey Serial Correlation LM Test for cost of credit that was conducted on the data post 
the analysis to assess any possibility of serial correlation. The test yielded an observed R2 of 0.100120 P 
= .9512>0.05, suggesting lack of serial correlation. 
Table 14: Breusch-Godfrey Serial Correlation LM post analysis Test for cost of credit 
     
     F-statistic 0.034343    Prob. F(2,85) 0.9663 
Obs*R-squared 0.100120    Prob. Chi-Square(2) 0.9512 
     
     Source: Author’s computations (2020) 
The study further tested for the Autoregressive Conditional Heteroskedasticity (ARCH) effect on cost of 
credit, with the null hypothesis that there was no ARCH effect. Since the estimated P-value corresponding to the 
observed R squared was .8241> 0.05, the null hypothesis that there was no ARCH effect was confirmed as seen 
in Table 15. 
Table 15: Heteroskedasticity post analysis Test: ARCH for cost of credit 
     
     F-statistic 0.048618    Prob. F(1,121) 0.8259 
Obs*R-squared 0.049402    Prob. Chi-Square(1) 0.8241 
     
     Source: Author’s computations (2020) 
 
4.0. Summary and Conclusion. 
The study investigated the long-run and short- run relationships among financial market frictions, flight to quality 
and cost of credit using Johansen’s methodology of multivariate cointegration analysis and Vector Error Correction 
Model. The objective was to determine the effect of Central Bank rate on cost of credit in Kenya. Correlation 
results shows that Central Bank rate was positively associated with the cost of credit and was significant at 5% 
level ( r = .805565; .0000> p=.05); vector error correction estimates indicated that Central Bank rate is an important 
determinant of cost of credit in the long run (t-statistics 2 < -7.79867). Vector error correction term coefficient 
shows that one unit change in Central Bank rate was associated with 15334.03 units increase in cost of credit on 
average ceteris paribus in the long run. The null hypothesis that there is no long run relationship between Central 
Bank rate and cost of credit is therefore, rejected and the alternative accepted. Wald statistics results shows that 
there is a short run causality running from Central Bank rate to cost of credit  and was significantly different from 
zero at 5% level (C(9)=C(10)=C(11)=C(12)=C(13)= C(14)= C(15)= 0; (.0163 < p= 0.05 ). The null hypothesis 
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that there is no short run relationship between Central Bank rate and cost of credit is therefore, rejected and the 
alternative accepted. This finding invalidates this study’s null hypothesis that Central Bank rate does not affect 
cost of credit in Kenya. This study concludes that market frictions i.e ceilings that are set too low are problematic 
especially in cases where they do not cover fees and commissions. World over, even if such ceilings are intended 
to reduce usury and exorbitant lending by MFIs who charge very high interest rates, they are very difficult to 
enforce. Moreover, lending practices without prudent regard for repayment capacity of micro enterprises, 
deceptive terms, and unlawful collection techniques causes more damage to microenterprises than do high interest 
rates. This is in agreement with Onyango and Odondo, (2018); Acclassato, (2006); Mohane et al, (2002)  who 
elaborated that when interest rate ceilings are implemented, MFIs may be forced to impose additional charges 
which are not part of interest rates to cover administrative costs, this not only reduces transparency about the 
borrowers true cost of borrowing but also camouflages the actual interest rates charged by MFIs even if on surface, 
the cost may appear to be reducing like in the case of interest rate ceilings as shown in this study. 
The second objective was to establish the effect of provisions in anticipation of loan losses on cost of credit 
in Kenya. From the research findings,  correlation results revealed that provisions in anticipation of loan losses 
was negatively associated with cost of credit and was significant  at 5% level ( r = -.296420; .0006> p=.05); vector 
error correction estimates denoted that provisions in anticipation of loan losses is an important determinant of cost 
of credit in the long run (t-statistics 2 < 2.80890).  Vector error correction term coefficient suggested that one unit 
change in provisions in anticipation of loan losses was associated with 0.582190 units decrease in cost of credit 
on average ceteris paribus in the long run. The null hypothesis that there is no long run relationship between 
provisions in anticipation of loan losses and cost of credit is therefore, rejected and the alternative accepted. Wald 
statistics results shows that there is no short run causality running from provisions in anticipation of loan losses to 
cost of credit and was not significantly different from zero at 5% level C(23)=C(24)=C(25)=C(26)= C(27)=C(28)= 
C(29)=0; (.5603> p= 0.05 ). The null hypothesis that there is no short run relationship between provisions in 
anticipation of loan losses and cost of credit is therefore, accepted and the alternative rejected. This study concludes 
that provisions in anticipation of loan losses affects cost of credit in the long run, provisions mitigates the MFIs 
against losses occasioned by loan default, costs that arise due to loan loss and default such as; costs associated 
with monitoring loans in arrears, post disbursement visits, costs of hiring external debt recovery experts, and other 
costs of delinquencies  are greatly reduced since IFRS 9 is forward looking and loans are properly appraised and 
provided for at all times, this consequently reduces cost of credit. 
As depicted in the research findings, correlation results evidenced that non-performing loans was positively 
associated with cost of credit and was significant at 5% level (.0388> p=.05). The null hypothesis that there is no 
long run relationship between non-performing loans and cost of credit is therefore, rejected and the alternative 
accepted. Wald statistics results shows that there is no short run causality running from non-performing loans to 
cost of credit and was not significantly different from zero at 5% level C(16)=C(17)=C(18)=C(19)=C(20)=C(21)= 
C(22)=0; (.0539> p= 0.05 ). The null hypothesis that there is no short run relationship between non-performing 
loans and Cost of Credit is therefore, accepted and the alternative rejected. The results of this study draw the 
conclusion that MFIs holding greater levels of NPLs are claimed for increasing profitability by equity investors in 
the long-run.  
Investors perceive these MFIs as riskier than their counterparts or other assets, claiming greater returns on 
the equity holdings of these MFIs and hence inducing an increase in their cost of credit. 
The last objective was to determine the long run relationship between flight to quality and cost of credit in 
Kenya. From the research findings, correlation results revealed that flight to quality was negatively associated with 
cost of credit and was significant at 5% level (r = -.687075; .0000> p=.05); vector error correction estimates 
elucidated that flight to quality is not an important determinant of cost of credit in the long run (t-statistics 2 > -
3.44197). The null hypothesis that there is no long run relationship between flight to quality and cost of credit is 
therefore, rejected and the alternative accepted. Wald statistics results shows that there is no short run causality 
running from flight to quality to cost of credit and was not significantly different from zero at 5% level 
C(30)=C(31)=C(32)=C(33)=C(34)=C(35)= C(36)=0; (.9188> p= 0.05 ). The null hypothesis that there is no short 
run relationship between flight to quality and cost of credit is therefore, accepted and the alternative rejected. This 
study concludes that the increasing Treasury Bills take up by MFIs, is not a good sign to micro borrowers either, 
as it simply shows that there could be a flight to quality effect on Micro lending. This is the usury argument, most 
MFI’s will tend to invest to a more profitable and risk free non funded income ventures like treasury bills. The 
findings in this is a confirmation of this argument, this however, is not a good news to borrowers as MFI’s as tend 
to shrink lending in favour such investments, adverse selection and stringent measures are therefore employed to 
identify the qualified borrowers, those with unidentifiable credit worthiness and risk are denied access, with the 
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In view of the findings, the explanatory variables for financial market frictions and flight to quality significantly 
affects cost of credit in the long run, based on the findings, this study recommends that pegging interest rates on 
Central Bank rate is good as it protects unsuspecting individuals from being exploited by the MFIs, however, it 
also comes with usury charges to cover their administrative and operating costs, as such the Government should 
incorporate MFIs opinions and views in a way that will allow them charge interests which are neither high or low 
but enough cover their costs to remain in business, MFIs are also advised to invest in non funded income to 
maximize their profits. It is also prudent for MFIs to invest in online and mobile lending in order to reduce 
administrative and operating costs.    
 
References 
Acclassato, H., D.,(2006). Microfinance institutions under interest rates ceilings. Orleans, France: University of 
Orleans. 
Bernanke, B and C Lown (1991): "The credit crunch", Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, No 2, pp 205-39. 
Bernanke, B and A Blinder (1988): "Credit, money and aggregate demand", American Economic Review 98, (May 
1988), 435-439. 
Brown, M., Jappelli, T., and Pagano, M., (2009), Information sharing and credit: Firm-level evidence from 
transition countries. University of Naples Federico, Italy; J. Finan. Intermediation 18 (2009) 151–172 
Caballero, R., Krishnamurthy, A., 2008, Collective risk management in a flight to quality episode. Journal of 
Finance 63, 2195-2230. 
Central Bank of Kenya -CBK. (2016). Bank Supervision Annual Report. Retrieved, April 17 from 
https://www.centralbank.go.ke/index.php/bank-supervision-reports. 
Cyert, R. M., P. Kumar & J. R. Williams (1993). Information, market imperfections and strategy, Strategic 
Management Journal, 27: 401-423. 
Cohen, B and M Scatigna (2016): "Banks and capital requirements: channels of adjustment", Journal of Banking 
and Finance, vol 69, supp 1, pp S56-S69. 
Chen, T., Chin, C. L., Wang, S., & Yao, C. (2013). The Effect of Mandatory IFRS Adoption on Bank Loan 
Contracting. Disponível em: http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm? abstract_id=2159001. 
DeFond, M., Hu, X., Hung, M., & Li, S. (2011). The impact of IFRS adoption on foreign mutual fund ownership: 
the role of comparability. Journal of Accounting and Economics, 51(3), 240- 58. 
Demetriades, P. O., and Luintel, K. (2001). “Financial Restraints in the South Korean Miracle.” Journal of 
Development Economics 64 (2): 459–79. 
Gaitho, N.W. (2013). The role of credit reference bureaus on credit access in Kenya. European Scientific Journal, 
9(13), 1857 – 7881. 
Gambacorta, L and H S Shin (2016): "Why bank capital matters for monetary policy", BIS Working Papers, no 
558, April. 
Gatev, E., Strahan, P.E., (2006). Banks’ advantage in hedging liquidity risk: theory and evidence from the 
commercial paper market. Journal of Finance 61, 867–892 
Gehrig, T., & Stenbacka, R. (2007). Information Sharing and Lending Market Competition with Switching Costs 
and Poaching. European Economic Review, 51, 77-99. 
Gubareva, M., & Borges, M., R., (2013)Typological Classification, Diagnostics, and Measurement of Flights-to-
Quality, Technical University of Lisbon, WP 15/2013/DE/UECE 
Gujarat and Porter, (2009) Basic Econometrics, 5th Edition. 
Guler, B., and Ozlale, U.,( 2005). Is there a flight-to-quality due to inflation uncertainty?. 
Green, W. H., (2003) Econometric Analysis, 5th Edition. 
Hela, Senda, Younes & Collins (2016) the effect of IFRS mandatory adoption on the information asymmetry Hela 
Turki1 *, Senda Wali1 and Younes Boujelbene1; Turkiet al., Cogent Business & Management (2016), 3: 
1209100 http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/23311975.2016.1209100 
Jones, E. (2012), Eurobonds, Flight to Quality, and TARGET2 Imbalances. European Policy Analysis 4, 1-12. 
Kashyap, Anil K., Jeremy C. Stein, & David W. Wilcox, (1993). Monetary policy and credit conditions: Evidence 
from the composition of external finance. American Economic Review 83:1, 78–98 (March). 
Khandare, D. M.,&Alshebami, A. S., ( 2015), The Impact of Interest Rate Ceilings on Microfinance Industry, 
School of Commerce & Management Science, SRTM University, India, International Journal of Social Work 
ISSN 2332-7278. 
Kishan, R and T Opiela (2000): "Bank size, bank capital, and the bank lending channel", Journal of Money, Credit 
and Banking, vol 32, pp 121- 41. 
Kishan, R and T Opiela (2006): "Bank capital and loan asymmetry in the transmission of monetary 
policy", Journal of Banking and Finance, vol 30, pp 249-85. 
Kiyotaki & R. Wright (1989) “On Money as a Medium of Exchange,” JPE 97, 927-54. 
Journal of Economics and Sustainable Development                                                                                                                        www.iiste.org 
ISSN 2222-1700 (Paper) ISSN 2222-2855 (Online)  
Vol.12, No.6, 2021 
 
78 
Kothari, C. R. (2004).Research Methodology: Methods and Techniques, (Second Edition), New Age International 
Publishers. 
Liew, V. K (2004). Which lag selection Criteria Should we employ? Economics Bulletin, 3(33), 1-9. 
Maimbo, S. M., & Gallegos, C. A. H.(2014). “Interest Rate Caps around the World” Still Popular, but a Blunt 
Instrument, Policy Research Working Paper 7070. World Bank Group. 
Mahony J. T. & Qian L. (2009). Market Frictions, Governance and Economic Rents: Taking Stock and Looking 
Ahead, University of Illinois at Urbana−Champaign, College of Business 
Miller, H. (2013). Interest Rate Caps and Their Impact on Financial Inclusion. Economic and Private Sector, 
Professional Evidence and Applied Knowledge Services. February 2013.EPS-PEAKS. 
Moosa, I.A. and R.H. Bhatti, 1997, “Are Asian markets integrated? Evidence for six countries vis-à-vis Japan”, 
International Economic Journal, 11, pp. 51-67. 
Mohane, H., Gerhard C. & William, G. (2002), The Effects of the Interest Rate Ceilings on the Micro Lending 
Market in South Africa. University of Pretoria.Department of Agricultural Economics, Extension and Rural 
Development. Working paper: 2002-02. 
Onyango, B., O., & Odondo, A., J., (2018), Logit Analysis of the Relationship between Interest Rate Ceiling and 
Micro Lending Market in Kenya, International Journal of Economics and Finance; Vol. 10, No. 8; 2018 ISSN 
1916-971X E-ISSN 1916-9728 Published by Canadian Center of Science and Education 
Saunders, M., Lewis, P. &Thornhill, A. (2009).Research methods for business students, 5th ed., Harlow, Pearson 
Education. 
Trejos & R. Wright (1995) “Search, Bargaining, Money, and Prices,” JPE 103, 118-41. 
Wooldridge J. M., (2009) Introductory Econometrics, A modern approach, 4th Edition. 
 
Appendices 
Appendix 1: Normalized Vector Error Correction Estimates for Cost of Credit 
Vector Error Correction Estimates 
Sample (adjusted): 8 132 
Included observations: 125 after adjustments 
Standard errors in ( ) & t-statistics in [ ] 
      
      Cointegrating Eq:  CointEq1     
      
      CC(-1)  1.000000     
CBR(-1) -15334.03     
  (1966.24)     
 [-7.79867]     
NPL(-1)  0.082959     
  (0.04605)     
 [ 1.80143]     
PALL(-1)  0.582190     
  (0.20727)     
 [ 2.80890]     
TBLL(-1) -0.192070     
  (0.05580)     
 [-3.44197]     
C  56530.39     
      
      Error Correction: D(CC) D(CBR) D(NPL) D(PALL) D(TBLL) 
      
      CointEq1 -0.153042  3.24E-05 -0.098528 -0.131603  0.020896 
  (0.07447)  (6.7E-06)  (0.17342)  (0.07076)  (0.13101) 
 [-2.05502] [ 4.86179] [-0.56814] [-1.85994] [ 0.15950] 
D(CC(-1)) -0.280753 -1.81E-05 -0.093932  0.129235  0.088512 
  (0.11653)  (1.0E-05)  (0.27136)  (0.11072)  (0.20500) 
 [-2.40928] [-1.73162] [-0.34615] [ 1.16726] [ 0.43177] 
D(CC(-2)) -0.230195 -3.08E-05 -0.200058  0.227909 -0.179292 
  (0.11810)  (1.1E-05)  (0.27502)  (0.11221)  (0.20776) 
 [-1.94915] [-2.90708] [-0.72744] [ 2.03112] [-0.86298] 
D(CC(-3)) -0.241145 -2.45E-05 -0.346744  0.088619 -0.249349 
  (0.12731)  (1.1E-05)  (0.29647)  (0.12096)  (0.22397) 
Journal of Economics and Sustainable Development                                                                                                                        www.iiste.org 
ISSN 2222-1700 (Paper) ISSN 2222-2855 (Online)  
Vol.12, No.6, 2021 
 
79 
 [-1.89410] [-2.14620] [-1.16956] [ 0.73261] [-1.11333] 
D(CC(-4)) -0.047669 -1.90E-05 -0.117016  0.041023 -0.022439 
  (0.12707)  (1.1E-05)  (0.29591)  (0.12073)  (0.22354) 
 [-0.37513] [-1.66527] [-0.39544] [ 0.33978] [-0.10038] 
D(CC(-5))  0.087582 -2.38E-05 -0.145775  0.164071  0.159961 
  (0.11715)  (1.0E-05)  (0.27280)  (0.11130)  (0.20608) 
 [ 0.74762] [-2.26289] [-0.53437] [ 1.47410] [ 0.77620] 
D(CC(-6)) -0.145295 -3.17E-05  0.054581  0.266266 -0.059517 
  (0.10768)  (9.6E-06)  (0.25075)  (0.10231)  (0.18943) 
 [-1.34932] [-3.28785] [ 0.21767] [ 2.60260] [-0.31419] 
D(CC(-7))  0.150619 -1.17E-05 -0.253100  0.094496  0.009472 
  (0.10403)  (9.3E-06)  (0.24224)  (0.09884)  (0.18300) 
 [ 1.44789] [-1.25463] [-1.04481] [ 0.95608] [ 0.05176] 
D(CBR(-1)) -1501.327  0.217002 -122.6347 -5303.275  5434.171 
  (1246.26)  (0.11167)  (2902.15)  (1184.09)  (2192.40) 
 [-1.20466] [ 1.94319] [-0.04226] [-4.47879] [ 2.47864] 
D(CBR(-2)) -1651.559  0.218703 -1110.633 -1581.121 -1414.146 
  (1361.15)  (0.12197)  (3169.70)  (1293.25)  (2394.51) 
 [-1.21335] [ 1.79311] [-0.35039] [-1.22260] [-0.59058] 
D(CBR(-3)) -2948.099  0.249228  2368.010 -2157.135 -2750.759 
  (1225.62)  (0.10982)  (2854.08)  (1164.47)  (2156.08) 
 [-2.40540] [ 2.26936] [ 0.82969] [-1.85246] [-1.27582] 
D(CBR(-4)) -1658.147  0.109505 -5701.502 -2222.762 -519.6397 
  (1216.47)  (0.10900)  (2832.78)  (1155.78)  (2139.99) 
 [-1.36308] [ 1.00459] [-2.01269] [-1.92317] [-0.24282] 
D(CBR(-5)) -2097.526  0.115615 -1597.035 -1914.518  3483.537 
  (1099.17)  (0.09849)  (2559.61)  (1044.33)  (1933.63) 
 [-1.90829] [ 1.17384] [-0.62394] [-1.83325] [ 1.80155] 
D(CBR(-6)) -3953.296  0.193127 -2096.981 -1443.159 -3109.548 
  (1102.49)  (0.09879)  (2567.36)  (1047.49)  (1939.48) 
 [-3.58578] [ 1.95492] [-0.81679] [-1.37773] [-1.60329] 
D(CBR(-7)) -360.4434  0.172326 -3481.927  230.0031 -324.5545 
  (1103.42)  (0.09887)  (2569.53)  (1048.38)  (1941.12) 
 [-0.32666] [ 1.74289] [-1.35508] [ 0.21939] [-0.16720] 
D(NPL(-1)) -0.058215  1.40E-06 -0.007966 -0.015766  0.107286 
  (0.04658)  (4.2E-06)  (0.10848)  (0.04426)  (0.08195) 
 [-1.24969] [ 0.33643] [-0.07344] [-0.35621] [ 1.30919] 
D(NPL(-2)) -0.036327 -1.78E-07 -0.097382 -0.031210 -0.136368 
  (0.04648)  (4.2E-06)  (0.10824)  (0.04416)  (0.08177) 
 [-0.78156] [-0.04286] [-0.89970] [-0.70672] [-1.66775] 
D(NPL(-3))  0.011731 -6.89E-06  0.007824  0.034301  0.390985 
  (0.04732)  (4.2E-06)  (0.11019)  (0.04496)  (0.08324) 
 [ 0.24792] [-1.62535] [ 0.07101] [ 0.76296] [ 4.69695] 
D(NPL(-4)) -0.000613 -3.43E-06 -0.142725  0.008279 -0.006012 
  (0.04826)  (4.3E-06)  (0.11238)  (0.04585)  (0.08490) 
 [-0.01270] [-0.79284] [-1.26998] [ 0.18056] [-0.07082] 
D(NPL(-5)) -0.036601  1.61E-05 -0.016293  0.031083  0.066112 
  (0.04627)  (4.1E-06)  (0.10775)  (0.04396)  (0.08140) 
 [-0.79101] [ 3.87178] [-0.15121] [ 0.70704] [ 0.81220] 
D(NPL(-6))  0.039657 -1.05E-05 -0.128982  0.063940 -0.052067 
  (0.04966)  (4.4E-06)  (0.11564)  (0.04718)  (0.08736) 
 [ 0.79860] [-2.36887] [-1.11540] [ 1.35521] [-0.59602] 
D(NPL(-7)) -0.009090 -7.27E-06  0.013720 -0.029145  0.182320 
  (0.05193)  (4.7E-06)  (0.12092)  (0.04934)  (0.09135) 
 [-0.17506] [-1.56345] [ 0.11347] [-0.59073] [ 1.99587] 
D(PALL(-1))  0.019035 -2.03E-05  0.080122 -0.175507  0.019256 
  (0.11082)  (9.9E-06)  (0.25807)  (0.10529)  (0.19495) 
 [ 0.17176] [-2.04644] [ 0.31047] [-1.66687] [ 0.09877] 
D(PALL(-2)) -0.087110 -1.16E-05  0.370261  0.075891  0.510238 
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  (0.10276)  (9.2E-06)  (0.23930)  (0.09763)  (0.18077) 
 [-0.84770] [-1.25847] [ 1.54729] [ 0.77730] [ 2.82253] 
D(PALL(-3)) -0.111448  2.47E-05 -0.173747  0.022606 -0.162781 
  (0.08755)  (7.8E-06)  (0.20389)  (0.08319)  (0.15402) 
 [-1.27291] [ 3.14896] [-0.85217] [ 0.27176] [-1.05686] 
D(PALL(-4)) -0.010655 -1.19E-05 -0.399370  0.173576 -0.241736 
  (0.08980)  (8.0E-06)  (0.20912)  (0.08532)  (0.15797) 
 [-0.11866] [-1.47727] [-1.90980] [ 2.03441] [-1.53023] 
D(PALL(-5)) -0.084158 -8.39E-06 -0.267549 -0.419821 -0.028146 
  (0.09131)  (8.2E-06)  (0.21264)  (0.08676)  (0.16064) 
 [-0.92164] [-1.02579] [-1.25823] [-4.83899] [-0.17522] 
D(PALL(-6))  0.099037 -1.86E-05 -0.156894 -0.298023 -0.180694 
  (0.10017)  (9.0E-06)  (0.23326)  (0.09517)  (0.17622) 
 [ 0.98869] [-2.07463] [-0.67260] [-3.13140] [-1.02541] 
D(PALL(-7)) -0.132993 -7.66E-06  0.398384  0.020549  0.390728 
  (0.10719)  (9.6E-06)  (0.24961)  (0.10184)  (0.18857) 
 [-1.24072] [-0.79778] [ 1.59601] [ 0.20178] [ 2.07209] 
D(TBLL(-1))  0.027159  1.17E-05  0.056412 -0.083478  0.104467 
  (0.05847)  (5.2E-06)  (0.13616)  (0.05555)  (0.10286) 
 [ 0.46449] [ 2.23475] [ 0.41431] [-1.50267] [ 1.01563] 
D(TBLL(-2))  0.038888  5.29E-06  0.036369 -0.060849 -0.079536 
  (0.05960)  (5.3E-06)  (0.13879)  (0.05663)  (0.10485) 
 [ 0.65248] [ 0.99068] [ 0.26205] [-1.07457] [-0.75860] 
D(TBLL(-3))  0.012957 -1.34E-06  0.290790  0.038588  0.111095 
  (0.05838)  (5.2E-06)  (0.13595)  (0.05547)  (0.10270) 
 [ 0.22194] [-0.25708] [ 2.13898] [ 0.69569] [ 1.08174] 
D(TBLL(-4))  0.075946  1.38E-05 -0.096263 -0.125363 -0.066740 
  (0.05885)  (5.3E-06)  (0.13704)  (0.05591)  (0.10352) 
 [ 1.29055] [ 2.62629] [-0.70246] [-2.24217] [-0.64469] 
D(TBLL(-5)) -0.002819 -9.14E-10  0.018941 -0.127860 -0.094336 
  (0.05871)  (5.3E-06)  (0.13672)  (0.05578)  (0.10328) 
 [-0.04802] [-0.00017] [ 0.13854] [-2.29220] [-0.91340] 
D(TBLL(-6)) -0.017641  1.28E-05  0.198515  0.097448 -0.062893 
  (0.05782)  (5.2E-06)  (0.13464)  (0.05493)  (0.10171) 
 [-0.30513] [ 2.46661] [ 1.47444] [ 1.77396] [-0.61836] 
D(TBLL(-7))  0.003123  5.81E-08  0.036370  0.040597 -0.011887 
  (0.05853)  (5.2E-06)  (0.13630)  (0.05561)  (0.10297) 
 [ 0.05336] [ 0.01108] [ 0.26684] [ 0.73000] [-0.11545] 
C -2657.863 -0.240128 -4361.820  1977.931  4180.180 
  (1522.14)  (0.13639)  (3544.59)  (1446.20)  (2677.72) 
 [-1.74613] [-1.76055] [-1.23056] [ 1.36767] [ 1.56110] 
      
      R-squared  0.439463  0.604968  0.233444  0.620356  0.475963 
Adj. R-squared  0.207517  0.441507 -0.083752  0.463261  0.259121 
Sum sq. resids  1.40E+10  112.3459  7.59E+10  1.26E+10  4.33E+10 
S.E. equation  12681.75  1.136368  29531.79  12049.06  22309.45 
F-statistic  1.894676  3.700985  0.735962  3.948939  2.194971 
Log likelihood -1325.519 -169.8290 -1430.337 -1319.173 -1395.560 
Akaike AIC  21.97612  3.335952  23.66672  21.87376  23.10581 
Schwarz SC  22.81765  4.177488  24.50826  22.71530  23.94734 
Mean dependent -759.6753 -0.076613 -392.7419  805.6452  3934.282 
S.D. dependent  14245.71  1.520583  28367.75  16446.44  25918.81 
      
      
Key:CC= Cost of Credit, CBR= Central bank Rate, NPL=  Non Performing Loans, 
 
PALL= Provisions in anticipation of Loan Losses, TBLL= Treasury Bills. 
 
Source: Author’s computations (2020) 
 
 
